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Abstract
In this paper we construct an overlapping generations model for the small open
economyincorporatinga realistic description of the mortality process. With age-
dependent mortality, the typical life-cycle pattern of consumption and saving re-
sults from the maximizing behaviour of individual households. Our “Blanchard-
Yaari-Modigliani”modelis used to analytically studya numberof typical shocks
affecting the small open economy, namely a balanced-budget public spending
shock, a temporary Ricardian tax cut, and an interest rate shock. The demo-
graphic details matter a lot—both the impulse-response functions and the wel-
fare proﬁles (associated with the differentshocks) are critically affected by them.
These demographic details furthermore do not wash out in the aggregate. The
model is ﬂexible and can be applied to a wide variety of theoretical and policy
issues.
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11 Introduction
It is possible that death may be the consequence of two generally co-
existing causes; the one, chance, without previous disposition to death or
deterioration; the other, a deterioration or an increased inability to with-
stand destruction. (Gompertz, 1825)
The opening quotation is a verbal introduction to a phenomenon that is now often
called Gompertz’ Law of mortality. In his path-breaking paper, Benjamin Gompertz1
(1825) identiﬁed two main causes of death, namely one due to pure chance and another
depending on the person’s age. He pointed out that if only the ﬁrst cause were relevant,
then “the intensity of mortality” would be constant and the surviving fraction of a given
cohort would decline in geometric progression. In contrast, if only the second cause
would be relevant, and “if mankind be continually gaining seeds of indisposition, or in
other words, an increased liability to death” then the force of mortality would increase
with age. Gompertz’ Law was subsequently generalized by Makeham (1860) who
argued that the instantaneous mortality rate depends both on a constant term (ﬁrst
cause) and on a term that is exponential in the person’s age (second cause).2
The microeconomic implications for consumption behaviour of lifetime uncer-
tainty—resulting from a positive death probability—were ﬁrst studied in the seminal
paper by Yaari (1965). He showed that, faced with a positive mortality rate, individ-
ual agents will discount future felicity more heavily due to the uncertainty of survival.
Furthermore, with lifetime uncertainty the consumer faces not only the usual solvency
condition but also a constraint prohibiting negative net wealth at any time—the agent
is simply not allowed by capital markets to expire indebted. Yaari assumes that the
household can purchase (annuity) or sell (life insurance) actuarial notes at an actuari-
ally fair interest rate. In the absence of a bequest motive, the household will use such
notes to fully insure against the adverse effect of lifetime uncertainty.
The Yaari insights were embedded in a general equilibrium growth model by Blan-
chard (1985). In order to allow for exact aggregation of individual decision rules,
Blanchard simpliﬁed the Yaari model by assuming a constant death probability, i.e.
only the ﬁrst cause of death is introduced into the model and households enjoy a
1As Hooker (1965) points out, Benjamin Gompertz can be seen as one of the founding fathers of
modern demographic and actuarial theory. See also Preston et al. (2001, p. 192). Blanchard (1985, p.
225) and Faruqee (2003, p. 301) incorrectly refer to the non-existing “Gomperty’s Law.”
2The continuous-time version of the Gompertz-Makeham Law of mortality takes the form m(u) =
µ0 +(µ1/µ2)[e
 2u − 1], where m(u) is the instantaneous mortality rate of a person with age u and the
µ
′
is are non-negative. This form is estimated below using US demographic data.
2perpetual youth. Because of its ﬂexibility, the Blanchard-Yaari model has achieved
workhorse status in the last two decades.3 As Blanchard himself points out, his mod-
elling approach has the disadvantage that it cannot capture the life-cycle aspects of
consumption and saving behaviour—the age-independent mortality rate ensures that
the propensity to consume out of total wealth is the same for all households.4
Blanchard’s modelling dilemma is clear: exact aggregation is “bought” at the ex-
pense of a rather unrealistic description of the demographic process.5 Of course, in
a closed-economy context, the aggregation step is indispensable because equilibrium
factor prices are determined in the aggregate factor markets. However, in the context
of a small open economy, factor prices are typically determined in world markets so
that the aggregation step is not necessary and life-cycle effects can be modelled. The
main objective of this paper is to elaborate on exactly this point. As we demonstrate
below, it is quite feasible to construct and analytically analyze a Blanchard-Yaari type
overlapping-generations model incorporating a realistic description of demography. In
addition we show that such a model gives rise to drastically different impulse-response
functions associated with various macroeconomic shocks—the demographic realism
matters.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model.
Following Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) and Faruqee (2003), we assume that the mor-
tality rate is age-dependent and solve for the optimal decision rules of the individual
households.6 We establish that the propensity to consume out of total wealth is an in-
creasing function of the individual’s age provided the mortality rate is non-decreasing
in age. Next, we postulate a constant birth rate and characterize both the population
composition and the implied aggregate population growth rate associated with the de-
3For the purpose of this paper, the most important extension is due to Buiter (1988) who allows
for non-zero population growth by using the insights of Weil (1989). For a textbook treatment of the
Blanchard-Yaari model, see Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch. 3) or Heijdra and van der Ploeg (2002, ch.
16).
4Blanchard shows that a “saving-for-retirement” effect can be mimicked by assuming that labour
income declines wih age. Faruqee and Laxton (2000) use this approach in a calibrated simulation model.
5Blanchard suggests that a constant mortality rate may be more reasonable if the model is applied
to dynastic families rather than to individual agents (1985, p. 225, fn.1). Under this interpretation the
mortality rate refers to the probability that the dynasty becomes extinct.
6The relationship between these papers and ours is as follows. Calvo and Obstfeld (1988) recognize
age-dependent mortality but do not solve the decentralized model. Instead, they characterize the dynam-
ically consistent social optimum in the presence of time- and age-dependent lump-sum taxes. Faruqee
(2003) models age-speciﬁc mortality in a decentralized setting but is ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, he
confuses the cumulative density function with the mortality rate (by requiring the death rate to go to unity
in the limit; see (2003, p. 302)). Furthermore, he is unable to solve the transitional dynamics.
3mographic process. Still using the general demographic process we characterize the
steady-state age-proﬁles for consumption, human wealth, and asset holdings.
In Section 3 we employ (projected) US demographic data to estimate a number
of parametric mortality models. In addition to the Blanchard model, we also estimate
three additional models that allow for age-dependent mortality. Not surprisingly, the
Gompertz-Makeham model provides by far the best ﬁt with the data. Interestingly,
however, the key aspects of the Gompertz-Makeham Law are also captured quite well
by our so-called piece-wise linear model which distinguishes two “phases” of life,
namely youth and old-age. During youth, the mortality rate is constant and quite low,
but during old-age it rises linearly with age. In our view, the piece-wise linear model
is interesting in itself for two reasons. First, it presents a continuous-time generaliza-
tion of the Diamond (1965) model, allowing for individuals to differ even within each
“phase” of life. Second, it gives rise to relatively simple analytical expressions for
the propensity to consume and the steady-state age proﬁles for consumption, human
wealth, and ﬁnancial assets. In the remainder of the section we show that the piece-
wise linear and Gompertz-Makeham models both give rise to bell-shaped age proﬁles
of ﬁnancial assets (Modigliani’s life-cycle pattern).
In Section 4 we compute and visualize the effects on the key variables of three
typical macroeconomic shocks affecting the small open economy, namely a balanced-
budget spending shock, a temporary tax cut (Ricardian equivalence experiment), and
an interest rate shock. We compare and contrast the results obtained for the Blanchard
and piece-wise linear models. In the second part of Section 4 we also present the
welfare effects associated with the shocks and demonstrate that the piece-wise linear
model may give rise to non-monotonic welfare effects on existing generations, some-
thing which is impossible in the Blanchard case. We conclude Section 4 by showing
that the two models also give rise to signiﬁcantly different impulse-response functions
for the aggregate variables (especially for asset holdings)—the heterogeneity does not
“wash out” in the aggregate.
Finally, in Section 5 we mention a number of possible applications of and exten-
sions to the model and draw some conclusions. The paper is concluded with a brief








[1 − Φ(τ − v)] ln¯ c(v,τ)eθ(v−τ)dτ, (2.1)
where v is the birth date, ¯ c(v,τ) is consumption of a vintage-v agent at time τ (≥ v),
and θ is the constant pure rate of time preference (θ > 0). Intuitively, 1 − Φ(τ − v)
is the probability that an agent born at time v is still alive at time τ (at which time
the agent’s age is τ − v). The instantaneous mortality rate (or death probability) of a






where φ(s) and Φ(s) denote, respectively, the density and distribution (or cumulative
density) functions. These functions exhibit the usual properties, i.e. φ(s) ≥ 0 and
0 < Φ(s) < 1 for s ≥ 0. Since, by deﬁnition, Φ′ (s) = φ(s) and Φ(0) = 0, it
follows that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (2.1) can be simpliﬁed to:7
1 − Φ(τ − v) = e−M(τ−v), (2.3)
where M (τ − v) is related to the mortality rate according to:8










As was pointed out by Yaari (1965), future felicity is discounted both because of pure
time preference (as θ > 0) and because of life-time uncertainty (as M (τ − v) > 0).9
7All derivations are documented in a separate Mathematical Appendix (see Heijdra and Romp, 2005).
Some key results are derived in a brief Appendix to the paper.
8The function M (s) is a primitive of m(s) if M
′ (s) = m(s) for every s in the relevant interval.
The indeﬁnite integral is then
R
m(s) = M (s) + C, where C is some constant which drops out when
the integral is evaluated for a particular interval, s0 ≤ s ≤ s1.
9Yaari (1965, p. 143) attributes the latter insight to Fisher (1930, pp. 216-217).
5From the perspective of some later time period t, the utility function of the agent





where the discounting factor due to life-time uncertainty (M (τ − v)) depends on the
age of the household at time τ.10 The household budget identity is given by:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = [r + m(τ − v)]¯ a(v,τ) + ¯ w(τ) − ¯ z (τ) − ¯ c(v,τ), (2.7)
where ¯ a(v,τ) is real ﬁnancial wealth, r is the exogenously given (constant) world rate
of interest, ¯ w(τ) is the wage rate, and ¯ z (τ) is the lump-sum tax (the latter two vari-
ables are assumed to be independent of age). Labour supply is exogenous and each
household supplies a single unit of labour. As usual, a dot above a variable denotes that
variable’s time rate of change, e.g. ˙ ¯ a(v,τ) ≡ d¯ a(v,τ)/dτ. Following Yaari (1965)
and Blanchard (1985), we postulate the existence of a perfectly competitive life in-
surance sector which offers actuarially fair annuity contracts to the households. Since
household age is directly observable, the annuity rate of interest faced by a house-
hold of age τ − v is equal to the sum of the world interest rate and the instantaneous
mortality rate of that household.
Abstracting from physical capital, ﬁnancial wealth can be held in the form of do-
mestic government bonds (¯ d(v,τ)) or foreign bonds ( ¯ f (v,τ)).
¯ a(v,τ) ≡ ¯ d(v,τ) + ¯ f (v,τ). (2.8)
The two assets are perfect substitutes in the households’ portfolios and thus attract the
same rate of return.
In the planning period t, the household chooses paths for consumption and ﬁnan-
cial assets in order to maximize lifetime utility (2.6) subject to the ﬂow budget identity
(2.7) and a solvency condition, taking as given its initial level of ﬁnancial assets ¯ a(v,t).
10The appearance of the term e
M(t−v) in front of the integral is a consequence of the fact that
the distribution of expected remaining lifetimes is not memoryless in general. Blanchard (1985) uses
the memoryless exponential distribution for which M (s) = µ0s (where µ0 is a constant) and thus







6The household optimum is fully characterized by:
˙ ¯ c(v,τ)
¯ c(v,τ)
= r − θ, (2.9)
∆(u,θ)¯ c(v,t) = ¯ a(v,t) + ¯ h(v,t), (2.10)
¯ h(v,t) ≡ eru+M(u)
  ∞
u
[ ¯ w(s + v) − ¯ z (s + v)]e−[rs+M(s)]ds (2.11)
where u ≡ t − v is the age of the household in the planning period and ∆(u,λ) is




e−[λs+M(s)]ds, (for u ≥ 0, λ > 0). (2.12)
Equation (2.9) is the consumption Euler equation, relating the optimal time proﬁle
of consumption to the difference between the interest rate and the pure rate of time
preference. The instantaneous mortality rate does not feature in this expression be-
cause households fully insure against the adverse effects of lifetime uncertainty (Yaari,
1965). In order to avoid having to deal with a taxonomy of different cases, we restrict
attention in the remainder of this paper to the case of a nation populated by patient
agents, i.e. r > θ.11 Equation (2.10) shows that consumption in the planning period is
proportional to total wealth, consisting of ﬁnancial wealth (¯ a(v,t)) and human wealth
(¯ h(v,t)). The proportionality factor is obtained by evaluating (2.12) for λ = θ.12
Clearly, ∆(u,θ) depends only on the household’s age in the planning period and not
on time itself. For future reference, Lemma 1 establishes some important properties
of the ∆(u,λ) function. Finally, human wealth is deﬁned in (2.11) and represents
the market value of the unit time endowment, i.e. the present value of after-tax wage
income, using the annuity rate of interest for discounting purposes. Unless after-tax
wage income is time-invariant, human wealth depends on both time and on the house-
hold’s age in the planning period.
Lemma 1 Let ∆(u,λ) be deﬁned as in (2.12) and assume that the mortality rate is
non-decreasing, i.e. m′ (s) ≥ 0 for all s ≥ 0. Then the following properties can be
established for ∆(u,λ): (i) decreasing in λ, ∂∆(u,λ)/∂λ < 0; (ii) non-increasing
in household age, ∂∆(u,λ)/∂u ≤ 0; (iii) upper bound, ∆(u,λ) ≤ 1/[λ + m(u)];
(iv) ∆(u,λ) > 0 for u < ∞; (v) for λ → ∞, ∆(u,λ) → 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
11The results for the other cases (with r < θ or r = θ) are easily deduced from our mathematical
expressions.
12As we demonstrate below, ∆(u,λ) plays a very important role in the model. Evaluated for λ = θ,
1/∆(u,θ) represents the marginal (and average) propensity to consume out of total wealth.
72.1.2 Demography
In order to allow for non-zero population growth, we employ the analytical framework
developed by Buiter (1988) which distinguishes the instantaneous mortality rate m(s)
and the birth rate b (> 0) and thus allows for net population growth or decline. The
population size at time t is denoted by L(t) and the size of a newborn generation is
assumed to be proportional to the current population:
L(v,v) = bL(v). (2.13)
The size of cohort v at some later time τ is:
L(v,τ) = L(v,v)[1 − Φ(τ − v)] = bL(v)e−M(τ−v), (2.14)




m(t − v)L(v,t)dv, (2.15)
and it is assumed that ¯ m is constant (see also below). Despite the fact that the expected
remaining lifetime of each individual is stochastic, there is no aggregate uncertainty in
the economy. In the absence of international migration, the growth rate of the aggre-
gate population, n, is equal to the difference between the birth rate and the aggregate
mortality rate, i.e. n ≡ b − ¯ m. It follows that L(v) = A0env, L(t) = A0ent and





= be−[n(t−v)+M(t−v)], t ≥ v. (2.16)
The key thing to note about (2.16) is that the population proportion of generation v at
time t only depends on the age of that generation and not on time itself.
2.1.3 Per capita household sector
Per capita variables are calculated as the integral of the generation-speciﬁc values
weighted by the corresponding generation weights. For example, per capita consump-





where l(v,t) and ¯ c(v,t) are deﬁned in, respectively, (2.16) and (2.10) above. Exact
aggregation of (2.10) is impossible because both ∆(u,θ) and the wealth components,
8¯ a(v,t) and ¯ h(v,t), depend on the generations index v. The “Euler equation” for per
capita consumption can nevertheless be obtained by differentiating (2.17) with respect
to time and noting (2.9) and (2.16):
˙ c(t) = b¯ c(t,t) + (r − θ)c(t) −
  t
−∞
[n + m(t − v)]l(v,t)¯ c(v,t)dv.
(2.18)
Per capita consumption growth is boosted by the arrival of new generations who start
to consume out of human wealth (ﬁrst term on the right-hand side) and by individual
consumption growth (second term). The third term on the right-hand side of (2.18)
corrects for population growth and (age-dependent) mortality.13
Per capita ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as a(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ a(v,t)dv. By differen-
tiating this expression with respect to t we obtain:
˙ a(t) = (r − n)a(t) + w(t) − z (t) − c(t), (2.19)
where w(t) = ¯ w(t), z (t) = ¯ z (t), and we have used equation (2.7) and noted the fact
that newborns are born without ﬁnancial assets (¯ a(t,t) = 0). The interest rate net of
population growth is assumed to be positive, i.e. r > n. As in the standard Blanchard
model, annuity payments drop out of the expression for per capita asset accumulation
because they constitute transfers (via the life insurance companies) from those who die
to agents who stay alive.
Finally, per capita human wealth is deﬁned as h(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ h(v,t)dv so that
˙ h(t) can be written as:
˙ h(t) = (r − n)h(t) + b¯ h(t,t) − w(t) + z (t). (2.20)
In the standard Buiter model per capita human wealth is the same for all generations
and accumulates at the constant annuity rate of interest (r + m). In contrast, in the
present model the effects of the net interest rate (r − n) and the birth rate (b) are
separate, with the former applying to per capita human wealth and the latter applying
to the human wealth of newborn generations.
13If the mortality rate were constant, as in Blanchard (1985) and Buiter (1988), then n ≡ b − m and
equation (2.18) would simplify to:
˙ c(t) = (r − θ)c(t) − b[c(t) − c(t,t)].
92.2 Firms, government, and foreign sector
Following Buiter (1988) wekeep the production side ofthe modelas simple aspossible
by abstracting from physical capital altogether.14 Competitive ﬁrms face the technol-
ogy Y (t) = k (t)L(t) where k(t) is an exogenous productivity index and L(t) is the
aggregate supply of labour. The real wage rate is then given by w(t) = k(t).
The government budget identity is given by:
˙ d(t) = (r − n)d(t) + g (t) − z (t), (2.21)
where d(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)¯ d(v,t)dv is the per capita stock of domestic bonds, and g(t)
is per capita government goods consumption. The government solvency condition is
lim
τ→∞d(τ) e(r−n)(t−τ) = 0, so that the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern-




[z (τ) − g(τ)]e(r−n)(t−τ)dτ. (2.22)
To the extent that there is outstanding debt (positive left-hand side), it must be exactly
matched by the present value of current and future primary surpluses (positive right-
hand side), using the net interest rate (r − n) for discounting purposes.
Finally, the evolution of the per capita stock of net foreign assets is explained by
the current account:
˙ f(t) = (r − n)f(t) + w(t) − c(t) − g(t), (2.23)
wherewehaveused y (t) ≡ Y (t)/L(t) = w(t)andwheref(t) ≡
  t
−∞ l(v,t)f(v,t)dv
denotes the per capita stock of foreign bonds in the hands of domestic households.
2.3 Steady-state equilibrium
It isrelatively straightforward to characterize the steady state of the model. Thesteady-
state values for all variables are designated by means of a hat overstrike, e.g. ˆ c is
steady-state per capita consumption. Where no confusion can arise, the time index is
also suppressed. For a constant level of technology, k(t) = ˆ k, the steady-state wage
rate is time-invariant, i.e. w(t) = ˆ w = ˆ k. If the government variables are also held
constant, so that z (t) = ˆ z, g (t) = ˆ g, and d(t) = ˆ d ≡ (ˆ z − ˆ g)/(r − n), then the
14In the context of a small open economy with ﬁrms facing convex investment adjustment costs, our
approach does not entail much loss of generality because the investment and savings systems decouple
in that case. See Matsuyama (1987), Bovenberg (1993, 1994), Heijdra and Meijdam (2002), and Heijdra
and van der Ploeg (2002, pp. 571-581).
10economy settles into a unique saddle-point stable steady-state equilibrium in which
c(t) = ˆ c, h(t) = ˆ h, a(t) = ˆ a, and f (t) = ˆ f.15
In the steady-state equilibrium, all individual household variables can be rewritten
solely in terms of their age, u ≡ t − v (as is also the case outside the steady state for
∆(u,θ)—see equation (2.12) above). By substituting w(t) = ˆ w and z (t) = ˆ z into
(2.11) we ﬁnd the expression for age-dependent human wealth:
ˆ ¯ h(u) ≡ ˆ ¯ h(v,t) = [ ˆ w − ˆ z]∆(u,r), (2.24)
where ∆(u,r) is obtained from (2.12) by setting λ = r. Since a newborn has no
ﬁnancial wealth, it follows from (2.10) that ˆ ¯ c(v,v) = ˆ ¯ h(0)/∆(0,θ). The Euler
equation (2.9) shows that ˆ ¯ c(v,t) = ˆ ¯ c(v,v)e(r−θ)u so that, by combining the two
results, we obtain:




Steady-state asset holdings can be computed by using (2.10):
ˆ ¯ a(u) = ∆(u,θ)ˆ ¯ c(u) − ˆ ¯ h(u). (2.26)
The steady-state per capita variables can be expressed in terms of individual vari-











b∆(0,θ + n − r). (2.27)
From (2.20) we ﬁnd the expression for steady-state per capita human capital:
ˆ h =
ˆ w − ˆ z − bˆ ¯ h(0)
r − n
=
ˆ w − ˆ z
r − n
[1 − b∆(0,r)], (2.28)
where we have used equation (2.24) (for v = 0) to get to the second expression. Fi-
nally, from equation (2.19) and the per capita version of (2.8) weobtain the expressions
for steady-state per capita ﬁnancial assets:
ˆ a ≡ ˆ d + ˆ f =
ˆ c + ˆ z − ˆ w
r − n
. (2.29)
15Saddle-point stability follows trivially from the fact that all agents in the economy satisfy their re-
spective solvency conditions. Consumption and human wealth are forward-looking (jumping) variables
whilst total ﬁnancial assets and net foreign assets are predetermined (sticky) variables.
11Armed with these expressions it is straightforward to derive the long-run effects of
various shocks impacting the economy.16 A balanced-budget increase in government
consumption (dˆ z = dˆ g > 0) leads to a decrease in steady-state human wealth and
consumption for all cohorts:
dˆ ¯ h(u)
dˆ z









Obviously, per capita steady-state consumption and human wealth also fall (see equa-
tions (2.27) and (2.28)). It follows from (2.29) that per capita steady-state ﬁnancial












Finally, since government debt is unchanged (by design) it follows from the ﬁrst equal-
ity in (2.29) that d ˆ f/dˆ z = dˆ a/dˆ z. The balanced-budget increase in government con-
sumption thus leads to a long-run reduction in ﬁnancial assets and a reduction in net
imports, just as in the standard open-economy Blanchard (1985, p. 230-231) model
with r > θ. (An decrease in steady-state productivity (d ˆ w < 0) has the same effects
on ˆ ¯ h(u), ˆ ¯ c(u), ˆ c, ˆ a, and ˆ f as a balanced-budget increase in government consumption.)
A long-run tax-ﬁnanced increase in public debt ((r − n)dˆ d = dˆ z > 0) leads to
a decrease in generation-speciﬁc and per capita steady-state consumption and human














Asinthe standard Blanchard model (withr > θ), government debt morethan displaces
foreign assets in the households’ portfolios (1985, p. 242).
An increase in the world interest rate leads to higher discounting of after-tax wages
and a reduction in both individual and aggregate human wealth:
dˆ ¯ h(u)
dr












du < 0, (2.35)
where we have used Lemma 1(i) to establish the sign in (2.34). By using (2.25) we
















16The impact and transitional effects of these shocks are studied in Section 4 of the paper.
12where we have used (2.24) to get to the second expression. The effect on consumption
depends on the age of the household. Clearly, for newborns (u = 0) consumption
falls because of the drop in the level of human wealth. Since the interest elasticity of
∆(0,r) is ﬁnite, however, it follows from (2.36) that for sufﬁciently old households
consumption will rise. The negative level effect on consumption (operating via human
wealth) is dominated by the positive growth effect (operating via the Euler equation
(2.9)).
The effect on aggregate consumption is thus also ambiguous in general. If the
hazard rate is very high around and after the point where the effect on individual con-
sumption becomes positive, there will be very few people for whom consumption ac-
tually rises. The effect on aggregate consumption is negative for such demographies.
In contrast, if a lot of people are still alive after the positive growth effect dominates
the initial negative wealth effect, then the weight of this positive effect dominates and
the aggregate effect is positive.









> 0, (for u > 0), (2.37)
and dˆ ¯ a(0)/dr = 0 (newborns possess no assets). Despite the ambiguity of the sign
of dˆ ¯ c(u)/dr, individual assets must increase for all generations.17 As a result, per
capita ﬁnancial assets also increase unambiguously. In the absence of pre-existing
government debt (ˆ z = ˆ g and ˆ d = 0), per capita net foreign assets increases by the
same amount as total ﬁnancial assets, i.e. dˆ a/dr = d ˆ f/dr > 0).
3 Demography
As was stressed by Blanchard (1985, p. 223), exact aggregation of the consump-
tion function is generally impossible because both the propensity to consume (our
1/∆(u,θ)) and the wealth components (our ¯ a(v,t) and ¯ h(v,t)) are age dependent.
Blanchard cuts this Gordian knot by assuming the mortality rate to be constant, i.e.
m(s) = µ0 > 0 and M (u) = µ0u. The advantages of his approach are its simplicity
and its undoubted ﬂexibility—the expected remaining planning horizon is 1/µ0 so, by
letting µ0 → 0, the inﬁnite-horizon Ramsey model is obtained as a special case. The
main disadvantage of the Blanchard approach is that it cannot capture the life-cycle
17This result follows from the fact that dˆ ¯ c(u)/dr is smallest for u = 0 at which point dˆ ¯ a(u)/dr = 0.
As u rises, dˆ ¯ c(u)/dr increases. Since dˆ ¯ h(u)/dr is negative for all u, the inequality in (2.37) follows
readily.
13aspect of consumption behaviour. In addition, the perpetual youth assumption is of
course easily refuted empirically as it runs foul of the Gompertz-Makeham Law of
mortality (see Preston et al. (2001) and below).
In the context of a small open economy, however, it is quite feasible to incorporate
a realistic demographic structure because the aggregation step is not necessary. The
interest rate is determined in world capital markets and is exogenous to the small open
economy. Conditional on the world interest rate, the factor price frontier pins down
the real wage rate (which may also depend on an exogenous productivity index). With
factor prices determined, the macroeconomic equilibrium can be studied directly at the
level of individual households.
3.1 Estimates
In this paper we estimate the survival function (1 − Φ(τ − v)) by using actual US
projections on expected survival rates for people born in 2001 (Arias et al., 2003,
p. 26, Table 6, Column 3). Surviving fractions are reported for 5-year intervals and at
birth. Denoting theactual expected surviving fraction upuntil age ui ofthe people born
in 2001 by S(ui), we can estimate the parameters of a given parametric distribution
function by means of non-linear least squares. Denoting the parameter vector by µ,
the model to be estimated is:
S(ui) = 1 − Φ(ui,µ) + εi = e−M(ui, ) + εi, (3.1)
where M(ui) =
  ui
0 m(s,µ)ds and εi is the stochastic error term. The estimates are
reported in Table 1 for various speciﬁcations of the mortality process. In that table,
ˆ σ is the estimated standard error of the regression, the t-statistics are given in round
brackets below the estimates, and   1 − Φ(100) represents the estimated proportion of
centenarians. Finally, ˆ n(b) is the estimated population growth rate (in percent per
annum), conditional on a given birth rate b (which is held constant at 1.5% per annum).
The growth rate of the population depends on the form of the mortality process and is





For a given birth rate b, equation (3.2) implicitly deﬁnes the coherent solution for n
and thus for the aggregate mortality rate, ¯ m ≡ b − n.18
18For a constant mortality rate m, we have 1/∆(0,n) = n + m so that (3.2) implies n = b − m.
Blanchard (1985) sets b = m so that n = 0 (constant population).
14Weconsider four different functional forms for the instantaneous mortality rate and
the associated M (ui) functions. The Blanchard model based on a constant mortality
rate (model 1) yields an estimated mortality rate of 0.7% per annum and displays the
worst ﬁt of all cases considered–the estimated standard error is 0.23 which far exceeds
the standard errors for the other models. Model 2 is based on the notion that the
mortality rate increases with age. This linear-in-age model ﬁts a little better than the
constant model but it predicts a negative mortality rate for newborns. Constraining
the constant to zero, the ﬁt deteriorates somewhat though it is still better than that of
the constant model. Models 1 and 2 both spectacularly overestimate the proportion of
centenarians (almost 50% and 34% for models 1 and 2 respectively).
Model 3 postulates that the mortality rate is constant up to a certain age ¯ u, after
which it increases linearly with age. The so-called piece-wise linear (PWL hereafter)
model ﬁts much better than the ﬁrst two models. The estimated standard error is 0.03
and the parameters are highly signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the model predicts quite realis-
tically that mortality starts to increase with age only after households reach the critical
age of about 61 years. Finally, for model 4 the mortality rate follows the Gompertz-
Makeham (GM hereafter) process. The GM model clearly displays the best ﬁt of all
cases considered–the estimated standard error is only one-sixteenth that of the next-
best (PWL) model and all coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant.19 Both models 3 and 4
yield reasonable predictions for the proportion of centenarians.
In the top panel of Figure 1 we illustrate the data points (stars) as well as the es-
timated survival functions for the different models. The poor ﬁt of models 1 and 2 is
conﬁrmed–the surviving fraction is underestimated up to about age 80 and overesti-
mated thereafter. Models 3 and 4 both track the data quite well. The key difference
between these models lies in their predicted mortality rates and expected remaining
lifetimes that are plotted in, respectively, the middle and bottom top panels of Figure
1. After about age 88, the mortality rate is steepest for the GM model. It is this non-
linear feature of the mortality process that the PWL model fails to capture adequately.
The expected remaining lifetimes for the GM and PWL models are, however, quite
similar.
3.2 Steady-state proﬁles
In Figure 2 we visualize (for all estimated models) the steady-state age proﬁles for
the propensity to consume (1/∆(u,θ)), human wealth (ˆ ¯ h(u)), consumption (ˆ ¯ c(u)),
19Thisgood ﬁtmaybe aconsequence of thefact thatdemographers oftenuse theGMmodel togenerate
demographic predictions especially at high ages. See Preston et al. (2001, p. 192) on this point.
15and ﬁnancial assets (ˆ ¯ a(u)). The analytical expressions for these variables are given
in, respectively, equations (2.12), (2.24), (2.25), and (2.26). Especially the ∆(u,λ)
function (deﬁned in (2.12)) plays a key role in the model. For models 1-3, closed-
form solutions for ∆(u,θ) can be derived. Indeed, for model 1 (the Blanchard case) it
reduces to ∆(u,θ) = 1/(θ + µ0) and is thus independent of the age of the household.












where erfcx(x) is the so-called scaled complementary error function (Kreyszig, 1988,
p. A 78). The properties of this function and its close relatives are covered in Lemma
2. Since erfcx(u) is a downward sloping function of the household’s age, it follows
from (3.3) that the marginal propensity to consume, 1/∆(u,θ), increases with age.
This is conﬁrmed in the top left-hand panel of Figure 2.
For the PWL model the expression for ∆(u,θ) features two branches, depending
on whether the household is still “young” (0 < u < ¯ u) or has entered “old age”
(u > ¯ u):
∆(u,θ) =

     
     
1 − e−(θ+ 0)(¯ u−u)
θ + µ0

















for u ≥ ¯ u
(3.4)
Young households are still on the ﬂat part of the mortality curve and for them ∆(u,θ)
can be written as a weighed average of 1/(θ + µ0) and ∆(¯ u,θ), with respective ex-
ponential weights 1 − e−(θ+ 0)(¯ u−u) and e−(θ+ 0)(¯ u−u). Intuitively, ¯ u − u measures
how young such households are, i.e. how far away they are from entering old age.20
For old households, whose u exceeds ¯ u, the lower branch of (3.4) is relevant. For such
households, it matters how old they are, i.e. how far along in old age they are as mea-
sured by u − ¯ u. It follows readily from (3.4) that ∆(u,θ) declines with age, i.e. the
marginal propensity to consume increases with age. This pattern is conﬁrmed in the
top left-hand panel of Figure 2.
20Obviously, if old age were to set in only after a very long time (¯ u → ∞), then one is back in the
standard Blanchard case with ∆(u,θ) = 1/(θ + µ0) indeﬁnitely.
16Lemma 2 The error function (erf (x)), complementary error function (erfc(x)), and
















dt = 1 − erf(x),
erfcx(x) ≡ ex2
erfc(x).
For non-negative values of x, these functions have the following properties:
(i) 0 < erf(x), erfc(x),erfcx < 1 for 0 < x ≪ ∞.
(ii) erf(0) = 1 − erfc(0) = 1 − erfcx(0) = 0.
(iii) limx→∞ erf(x) = 1, limx→∞ erfc(x) = limx→∞ erfcx(x) = 0.
(iv) erf′(x) > 0, erfc′(x) < 0, erfcx′(x) < 0.
(v) erfcx(x) ≈ 1/(x
√
π) for large x.
For the GM model no closed-form solutions for ∆(u,θ) can be obtained, and
numerical integration techniques must be used. As is shown in the top left-hand panel
of Figure 2, the marginal propensity to consume for these models closely tracks the
solution for the PWL model up to about age u = 80. Thereafter the non-linearity of
the mortality rate starts to cut in and 1/∆(u,θ) increases more rapidly than is implied
by the PWL model.
Inthe topright-hand panel ofFigure 2theageproﬁle forsteady-state human wealth
(ˆ ¯ h(u), deﬁned in (2.24) above) is plotted for the different mortality models.21 For the
standard Blanchard model the annuity rate of interest is age-independent because the
mortality rate is constant. As a result, human wealth is age-independent also. For the
linear model the annuity rate of interest rises with age so that discounting of after-tax
wage income is heavier the older the household is. Human wealth gradually falls with
age as a result. Indeed, it follows from (2.24) that ˆ ¯ h(u) is proportional to ∆(u,r)
which is downward sloping in u for any demography with a non-decreasing mortality
rate (see Lemma 1).
21As parameter values we used b = 0.015, θ = 0.035, r = 0.04, w = 5, and z = 0. The implied
values for the population growth rate (n) are reported in Table 1. The simulation results are quite robust
for different parameter values.
17The pattern for human wealth looks rather similar for the remaining models 3 and
4. Exploiting the proportionality between ˆ ¯ h(u) and ∆(u,r), we ﬁnd that the slope of
the human wealth proﬁle is given by:
dˆ ¯ h(u)
du
= [ ˆ w − ˆ z]
 
(r + m(u))∆(u,r) − 1
 
< 0, (3.5)
where the term in square brackets on the right-hand side is equal to ∂∆(u,r)/∂u.
During the early phase of life, the annuity rate r + m(u) is relatively low, ∆(u,r) is
relatively high, and human wealth falls only slightly as young agents are still on the
ﬂat part of the mortality curve. At high ages, r + m(u) is high, ∆(u,r) is low, and
dˆ ¯ h(u)/du is again relatively low. The PWL and GM models both give rise to inverse-
S-shaped proﬁles for human wealth with a point of inﬂexion located at the approximate
age of 60. Only after about age 80 do the paths implied by the two models diverge
somewhat, with the GM model showing the sharpest decline.
In the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 2 the age proﬁle of steady-state consump-
tion (ˆ ¯ c(u)) is visualized. As follows readily from (2.25), the slope of the consumption
age proﬁle is the same for all models. Interestingly, the estimated mortality models all
predict very similar steady-state consumption paths (in level terms).
Finally, in the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 2 the age proﬁle of steady-state
ﬁnancial assets (ˆ ¯ a(u) as deﬁned in (2.26) above) is visualized. For both models 1
and 2, ﬁnancial assets rise with age. Matters are vastly different for models 3 and 4.
For these models ﬁnancial asset holdings follow the classic life-cycle pattern stressed
by Modigliani and co-workers. i.e. households save up until middle age after which
dissaving takes place. Again the most pronounced dissaving effect takes place for the
GM model. Despite the fact that very old agents have hardly any ﬁnancial assets left,
the annuity rate of interest is so high that a high consumption level can nevertheless be
maintained.
The upshot of the discussion so far is as follows. The constant and linear mod-
els track the demographic data very poorly and predict unrealistic age patterns for the
consumption propensity, human wealth, and ﬁnancial wealth. In contrast, the PWL
and GM models track the data rather well and predict the relevant life-cycle patterns.
While the GM model slightly outperforms the PWL model, it carries a (minor) dis-
advantage in that it can only be analyzed numerically, whereas the PWL model can
be solved analytically in terms of well-known functions. Indeed, the salient features
of the Gompertz-Makeham Law seem to be approximated rather well by means of a
piece-wise linear mortality rate. A further theoretical advantage of the PWL model is
that it enables a conceptual distinction between youth and old age (just as is possible
18in the two-period Diamond (1965) model).
In Figure 3 we visualize the age proﬁles for the different variables at the cohort
level. Cohort-level variables are obtained by multiplying individual outcomes for
members of a given cohort by the relative population size of that cohort, e.g. for
human wealth we have:
ˆ H (u) ≡ l(v,t)ˆ ¯ h(u) = [ ˆ w − ˆ z]Ω(u,r), (3.6)






Like ∆(u,λ), the Ω(u,λ)-term depends critically on the parameters of the mortality
process. In addition, however, Ω(u,λ) also depends on the birth rate b and the rate of
population growth n because these parameters affect the population proportions of the
cohorts.
The cohort-level values for consumption and ﬁnancial wealth are deﬁned as fol-
lows:




ˆ A(u) ≡ l(v,t)ˆ ¯ a(u) = ∆(u,θ) ˆ C(u) − ˆ H(u). (3.9)
In the top right-hand panel of Figure 3 cohort-level human wealth is visualized for the
different mortality models. For all models, cohort-level human wealth falls with the
age of the cohort. This is not surprising since individual human wealth either stays
the same (model 1) or falls (models 2-4) with age, and the population proportion falls
with age (see top left-hand panel). As was the case for individual human wealth, the
results for models 3-4 are very similar. This similarity also holds for the cohort-level
results for consumption (bottom left-hand panel) and ﬁnancial assets (bottom right-
hand panel). Note that even for models 1 and 2, ˆ A(u) ultimately goes to zero for very
old household as the decline in the population share starts to dominate the increase in
individual asset holdings.
4 Visualizing Shocks with Realistic Demography
In this section we compute and visualize the effects on the different variables of a
number of prototypical shocks affecting a small open economy.22 The analytical ex-
22These shocks do not have to be inﬁnitesimal as no linearization techniques have been used.
19pressions for the general demographic model are reported in the Appendix to this pa-
per. To cut down on the number of illustrations, however, we restrict attention in this
section to the visualization of the main contrasts between the standard Blanchard case
and the PWL model. As was demonstrated above, the latter model captures the actual
(expected) demography for the United States rather well.
4.1 Shocks
4.1.1 Balanced-budget ﬁscal policy
The ﬁrst shock consists of an unanticipated and (believed to be) permanent increase in
government consumption which is ﬁnanced by means of lump-sum taxes (i.e. dˆ g =
dˆ z > 0). The effects of this shock on individual human wealth (¯ h(v,t)) and ﬁnancial
assets (¯ a(v,t)) are illustrated in Figure 4. In that ﬁgure, the left-hand panels depict the
Blanchard case whilst the right-hand panels illustrate the results for the PWL model.
In the Blanchard case, the increase in the lump-sum tax causes a once-off decrease
in human wealth which is the same for all existing and future generations. In stark
contrast, in the PWL model the fall in human wealth depends both on time and on
the generations index. The top right-hand panel of Figure 4 shows the effects for two
existing households (aged, respectively, 40 and 20 at the time of the shock) and two
future households (born respectively one second and 40 years after the shock). As
a result of the shock there is a once-off change in the age proﬁle of human wealth.
This proﬁle itself does not depend on time because there is no transitional dynamics in
after-tax wages.
In the bottom two panels of Figure 4 the paths for ﬁnancial assets are illustrated. In
the Blanchard case these assets rise monotonically over time for each household. The
shock induces a slight kink (at time t = 0) in the proﬁle for each generation. For the
PWL model in the right-hand panel, the crowding-out effect due to the tax increase is
much more visible. The peak in ﬁnancial asset holdings is higher, the older the existing
household is (compare, for example, the 40 and 20 year old households). The proﬁles
for the future households born, respectively, in 0 and 40 years time are identical in
shape (Again, this is because of the lack of transitional dynamics in after-tax wages).
4.1.2 Temporary tax cut
The second shock consists of a typical Ricardian equivalence experiment. At impact
the lump-sum tax is reduced and deﬁcit ﬁnancing is used to balance the budget. As
a result, the stock of government debt gradually increases over time. In order to en-
20sure that government solvency is maintained, the tax is gradually increased over time
and ultimately rises to a level higher than in the initial situation. The shock that is
administered thus takes the following form (for t ≥ 0):
dz (t) = −dz0e−χt + dˆ z[1 − e−χt], (4.1)
where 0 < χ ≪ ∞, dz0 > 0, and dˆ z = [(r − n)/χ]dz0 > 0. At impact, the lump-
sum tax falls by dz0 but in the long run it rises by dˆ z. (The long-run effect on public
debt equals dˆ d = dz0/χ > 0.) In the simulations, the persistence parameter is set
at χ = 0.1 implying that the tax reaches its pre-shock level only after about 13 to 14
years.23
Theeffects onhuman and ﬁnancial wealth are illustrated forthe twocases in Figure
5. In the Blanchard case, human wealth is age-independent. It nevertheless features
transitional dynamics because the path of lump-sum taxes is time dependent. Human
wealth increases at impact (because of the tax cut), but during transition it gradually
falls again (because of the gradual tax increase). In the long run, the permanently
higher taxes (needed to ﬁnance interest payments on accumulated debt) ensure that
human wealth is less than before the shock.
In the PWL model, the effect on human wealth is both time- and age-dependent. At
impact, all existing households experience an increase in their human wealth because
of the tax cut. For each household, human wealth declines during transition both
because of ageing (gradual increase in the annuity rate of interest) and because the tax
rises over time. For the future household born 40 years after the shock, the human
wealth proﬁle is virtually in the steady state again as most of the shock has worn out
by then.
In the bottom panels of Figure 5 the proﬁles for ﬁnancial assets are illustrated. In
the Blanchard case the tax cut causes a slight acceleration in asset accumulation at
impact. This kink also occurs for the PWL model in the bottom right-hand right panel.
The PWL case illustrates quite clearly that the Ricardian equivalence experiment re-
distributes resources from distant future generations toward near future and existing
generations. Especially members of the generation born at the time of the shock react
strongly to the tax cut as far as their savings behaviour is concerned. Indeed, their
maximum asset holding peaks at a much higher level than that of 40 year old existing







r − n + χ
￿
.
For the piece-wise linear case t0 = 13.2 years whilst for the Blanchard case we ﬁnd t0 = 14.2 years.
21generations and generations born 40 years after the shock.24
4.1.3 Interest rate shock
The ﬁnal shock analyzed in this paper consists of an unanticipated and permanent
increase in the world interest rate (i.e. dr > 0 for t ≥ 0). The effects of this shock on
human and ﬁnancial wealth are illustrated in Figure 6. In the Blanchard case the shock
causes a once-off decrease in age-independent human wealth. The higher annuity rate
of interest leads to stronger discounting of future after-tax wages. For the PWL model
there is a once-off downward shift in the age proﬁle of human wealth. Like the shock
itself, this age proﬁle displays no further transitional dynamics over time.
The bottom panels of Figure 6 illustrate the effects on ﬁnancial assets. Whilst the
effects for the Blanchard case speak for themselves, those for the PWL model warrant
some further comment. For future generations, the age proﬁle of ﬁnancial assets fea-
tures a once-off upward shift at impact and displays no further transitional dynamics
thereafter. In contrast, for existing generations the time path of assets depends both on
their age and on time. This transitional dynamics is caused by the fact that the con-
sumption path for such generations depends on both t and v separately (see Appendix).
Existing generations are affected by the interest rate hike both via their human wealth
and via their accumulated ﬁnancial assets which attract a higher rate of return after the
shock.25
24The following temporary productivity shock features results that are very simular to those of the
Ricardian tax cut:
dw(t) = dw0e
−ξt, ( for t ≥ 0),
where 0 < ξ ≪ ∞ and dw0 > 0. In the simulations (not shown), the persistence parameter is set
at ξ = 0.1, implying a half-life of the adjustment of about (1/ξ)ln2 = 6.93 years. The equivalency
between the two shocks is not surprising, of course, because the temporary wage increases boosts human
wealth just as a temporary tax cut does.
25The bottom right-hand panel of Figure 6 also shows a slightly unattractive feature of the piece-wise
linear model, namely that individual assets start to rise again after about age 100. This is due to the fact
that the mortality rate does not rise sufﬁciently quickly after about age 85 for that model–see Figure 1.
As a result, human wealth does not fall quickly enough (see Figure 2) and assets start to rise again at high
ages. Figure 3 conﬁms, however, that assets of the old cohorts approach zero for the piece-wise linear
model. There are very few centenarians in the piece-wise linear model.
224.2 Welfare effects
The Blanchard model is often used to investigate the intergenerational welfare effects
of various policy measures.26 In this section we visualize the intergenerational welfare
effects associated with the three shocks studied above. For existing households, the
change inwelfare from the perspective ofthe shock period t = 0isevaluated (dΛ(v,0)
for v ≤ 0) whereas for future agents the welfare change from the perspective of their
birth date is computed (dΛ(v,v) for v > 0). As is shown in the Appendix, the welfare





+ ∆(−v,θ)lnΓE(v), (for v ≤ 0), (4.2)
where ∆(−v,θ) is deﬁned in equation (2.12) above and where ΓE(v) is deﬁned as:
ΓE(v) ≡
ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ¯ h(v,0)
ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ˆ ¯ h(−v)
, (for v ≤ 0). (4.3)
Intuitively, ΓE(v) captures the effect of theimpact change in human wealth forexisting
generations. The welfare effect consists of two separate components. The ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of (4.2) represents the consumption growth effect and is only
relevant for the world interest rate shock (i.e., if dr > 0). Individual consumption
growth is equal to r−θ and an increase in r leads to a steeper consumption time proﬁle.
The mortality process exerts a non-trivial inﬂuence on the consumption growth effect
via the utility function. The second term on the right-hand side of (4.2) summarizes the
welfare effect of the change in the level of consumption caused by the impact change
in human wealth. This human wealth effect is relevant for all shocks and is equal
to the product of lnΓE(v) (deﬁned in (4.3)) and the inverse propensity to consume
∆(−v,θ).




se−[θs+M(s)]ds + ∆(0,θ)lnΓF(v), (for v > 0), (4.4)





, (for v > 0). (4.5)
26See, for example, Bovenberg (1993, 1994) on capital taxation and investment subsidies, Bettendorf
and Heijdra (2001a, 2001b) on product subsidies and tariffs under monopolistic competition, and Heijdra
and Meijdam (2002) on government infrastructure. All these studies are set in the context of a small open
economy.
23Here, ΓF(v) represents the effect on the human wealth of a future newborn. Just as for
existing generations, the welfare effect for future generations consists of a consump-
tion growth effect (ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (4.5)) and a human wealth effect
(second term).
The welfare effects of the different shocks are illustrated in Figure 7. The left-hand
panels present the results for the Blanchard case whilst the right-hand panels visualize
those for the PWL model. The welfare effects of balanced-budget ﬁscal policy are
illustrated in the top panels. All present and future generations experience a reduction
in human wealth and as a result the welfare effect is negative for all generations. The
effect is the same for all future generations because there is no transitional dynamics
in human wealth (see above). For existing generations the welfare loss declines with
the age of the generation. The human wealth effect decreases with age because both
the inverse propensity to consume (∆(−v,θ)) and the relative importance of human
wealth (lnΓE(v) in (4.2) above) decline with age. The Blanchard and PWL models
thus give qualitatively similar welfare results for the spending shock. A key difference
between the two models concerns the slope of the welfare proﬁle for existing gener-
ations. In the PWL model (right-hand panel) the welfare effect is practically zero for
all generations older than 100 years. In contrast, for the Blanchard case (left-hand
panel) there is still a noticeable welfare effect for 200 year old generations. This low
“generational adjustment speed” of the Blanchard model is also observed for the other
shocks. Intuitively, in the Blanchard case, old generations are not killed off rapidly
enough (see also the top panel of Figure 1).
The middle two panels of Figure 7 illustrate the welfare effects for the Ricardian
tax cut experiment. All existing generations as well as future generations born close
to the time of shock beneﬁt at the expense of more distant future generations. For
future generations the welfare loss is larger the later they are born. For existing gener-
ations the welfare proﬁle is monotonically decreasing in age for the Blanchard case but
non-monotonic for the PWL model. In the Blanchard case, ∆(−v,θ) = ∆(0,θ) =
1/(θ + µ0) is constant and lnΓE (v) declines monotonically with age. In contrast, for
the PWL model, ∆(−v,θ) decreases with age but lnΓE (v) is non-monotonic. In-
deed, lnΓE (v) is increasing in age for all generations up to about 120 years and only
decreases in age thereafter.27 As a result, the welfare proﬁle for existing generations
27Of course, there are virtually no centenarians predicted by the PWL model so the downward sloping
part of the lnΓE (v) function is practically irrelevant. In contrast, the estimated Blanchard demography
predicts that about 50 percent of newborns will still be alive at age 100. See the bottom panel of Figure
1.
24displays a bump around the age of 60 in the middle right-hand panel of Figure 7. At
that point, the drop in ∆(−v,θ) just matches the increase in lnΓE (v).
In the bottom two panels of Figure 7 the welfare effects for the interest rate shock
are illustrated. Since the shock induces no transitional dynamics in the age proﬁle
of human wealth for future generations, the welfare effect is the same for all future
generations in both models. For existing generations the welfare effect increases with
age in the Blanchard model, but is non-monotonic for the PWL model. For an interest
shock both the consumption growth effect and the human wealth effect are relevant.
The shock induces a decrease in lnΓE (v) which falls with age in both models. In
the Blanchard case, the consumption growth effect is constant (and positive) for all
generations. In contrast, for the PWL model, the consumption growth effect is positive
and constant for future generations, but falling in age for existing generations. As a
result, the total effect on welfare displays a bump around the age of 25 for the PWL
model (see the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 7).
4.3 Aggregate effects
As was pointed out above, Blanchard (1985) assumes a constant mortality rate in order
to allow for exact aggregation of the consumption function. With the more general
mortality processes considered in this paper, only numerical aggregation is possible.
Thissubsection visualizes the aggregate effects on the key variables of the three shocks
considered above. To what extent do the aggregate results predicted by the Blanchard
and PWL models differ?
In Figure 8 we illustrate the effects on human wealth (ﬁrst row), consumption
(second row), and ﬁnancial assets (third row) for the spending shock (ﬁrst column),
the Ricardian tax cut (second column), and the interest rate shock (third column). To
facilitate the comparisons between the two models, wereport the percentage deviations
from the steady state for all variables, i.e. (h(t) − ˆ h)/ˆ h, (c(t) − ˆ c)/ˆ c, are plotted
(a(t) − ˆ a)/ˆ a in Figure 8.
For the spending shock, the results for human wealth are identical and those for
consumption and ﬁnancial assets are qualitatively very similar but differ in terms of
the speed of adjustment towards the new steady state. The slow speed of convergence
is also a feature of the Blanchard results for the other two shocks.
For the Ricardian tax cut, the effects on human wealth are again similar but those
on consumption and ﬁnancial wealth are not. For the PWL model, the impact effect
on consumption is much larger, and the slope of the aggregate Euler equation is much
steeper during transition, than forthe Blanchard model. Similarly, the savings response
25is much more pronounced for the PWL model.
Finally, for the interest rate shock the effect on human wealth is qualitatively the
same for the two models, though the Blanchard model overestimates the fall in human
wealth. The impact reduction in consumption is virtually the same for the two models
but transition is much faster for the PWL model. Again, the savings response at impact
is stronger for the PWL model.
4.4 Discussion
The key ﬁndings of this section are as follows. Incorporating a realistic demographic
structure is quite feasible in the context of a small open economy facing a constant
world interest rate. At the level of individual households, a realistic description of
the mortality process reinstates the classic life-cycle consumption-saving insights of
Modigliani and co-workers.
The welfare effects associated with the different shocks are also potentially af-
fected in a non-trivial manner by the incorporation of a more realistic demography.
Two key difference stand out between the Blanchard and PWL models. First, the
PWL model predicts a much faster (and in our view more realistic) “generational con-
vergence speed” of the welfare effects than the Blanchard model. Second, the PWL
model incorporates more extensive age-dependency and as a result may give rise to
non-monotonic welfare effect on existing generations—something which is impossi-
ble in the Blanchard case (for the shocks studied).
Finally, we have demonstrated that the demographic details do not “wash out”
at the aggregate level. The impulse-response functions for the different shocks are
quite different for the Blanchard and PWL models, especially the ones for per capita
consumption and ﬁnancial assets.
In some applications of our model, it may the case that individual behaviour de-
pends in part on aggregate variables so that knowledge of the latter is crucial. For
example, if the revenue of a consumption tax (tC) is recycled in a lump-sum fashion
to households (i.e. ¯ z (t) = z (t) = −tCc(t)) then individual consumption, human
wealth, and ﬁnancial assets will all depend on the aggregate tax revenue. This com-
plication can be easily dealt with by using an iterative procedure in the simulations.
In the ﬁrst step the initial tax revenue and implied lump-sum transfer are guessed and
individual and aggregate consumption levels are computed. In subsequent steps, the
aggregate information is used to update the guess for transfers until convergence is
achieved.
265 Extensions and Conclusion
The framework developed in this paper can be extended in a number of directions,
all of which we plan to pursue in the near future. First, in order to investigate the
effects of demographic change, it is necessary to generalize the stochastic distribution
for expected remaining lifetimes. Two possibilities can be distinguished. Embodied
demographic change can be studied by writing the density function as φ(v,s), so
that both the cumulative distribution, Φ(v,s), and the instantaneous mortality rate,
m(v,s), are generation speciﬁc. In contrast, disembodied demographic change can be
modelled by writing the functions as φ(t,s), Φ(t,s), and m(t,s), i.e. by postulating
a time-dependent mortality process.
Second, the age proﬁle for individual consumption could be generalized by intro-
ducing shift factors in the utility function. In the current model (with r > θ) con-
sumption is increasing in the age of the household. There are reasons to believe that in
reality consumption is hump-shaped, i.e. ¯ c(v,t) features a rising time proﬁle early on
in life followed by a falling proﬁle later on. A simple way to capture this effect is to
assume that a household’s “needs” get smaller the older they get. In the diminishing-










where σ > 0 is the intertemporal substitution elasticity and ¯ e(v,τ) is effective con-
sumption:
¯ e(v,τ) ≡ ¯ c(v,τ)exp
 





with ζ0 > 0 and ζ1 > 0. According to (5.2), a given amount of actual consumption,
¯ c(v,τ), yields more effective consumption (featuring in thefelicity function), the older
the household is. Using this speciﬁcation of preferences, it is straightforward to show
that the individual consumption Euler equation (2.9) is generalized to:
˙ ¯ c(v,τ)
¯ c(v,τ)
= σ (r − θ) − (1 − σ)ζ0 (τ − v)
ζ1 . (5.3)
For the empirically relevant case (with 0 < σ < 1), consumption rises during the early
phase of life (τ − v low) and falls during the later stages of life (τ − v high).
A third extension endogenizes the household’s labour supply and retirement deci-
sions. The introduction of a leisure choice decision is straightforward. Focusing on a




lnU [¯ c(v,τ),1 − ¯ n(v,τ)]e−[θ(τ−t)+M(τ−v)]dτ, (5.4)
whereU [ ]issubfelicity depending onconsumption, ¯ c(v,τ), andlabour supply, ¯ n(v,τ).
The time endowment equals 1. Of course, labour supply features the restriction 0 ≤
¯ n(v,τ) ≤ 1, with the lower bound reﬂecting the retirement decision.28 With endoge-
nous labour supply, the household budget identity (2.7) is modiﬁed to:
˙ ¯ a(v,τ) = [r + m(τ − v)]¯ a(v,τ) + ¯ w(τ) ¯ n(v,τ) − ¯ z (v,τ) − ¯ c(v,τ). (5.5)
where ¯ w(τ) ¯ n(v,τ) is wage income and ¯ z (v,τ) represents an age-dependent lump-
sum tax (e.g. a pay-as-you-go pension system). For a small open economy facing a
constant world interest rate it is straightforward to compute the optimal retirement age
implied by the model and to study how it is affected by various shocks.29 The most
interesting shocks that can be studied with this extended model are ageing shocks and
pension reform.
Whereas the ﬁrst three extensions are relatively straightforward, the fourth and ﬁ-
nal one is not. The introduction of a realistic mortality process in a closed economy is
complicated by the fact that exact aggregation of the consumption function is impossi-
ble (see above). Of course, the steady state can still be characterized analytically quite
easily (see Subsection 2.3 above). The transitional and long-run effects of various
shocks are, however, much more difﬁcult to compute due to the fact that equilibrium
factor prices will generally change. In the near future we wish to investigate whether
approximate aggregation of the key behavioral relationships is feasible for particular
shock parameterizations. If that fails, numerical methods will be employed to charac-
terize transitional dynamics.
In conclusion, we express the sincere hope that the Blanchard-Yaari-Modigliani
model constructed in this paper will prove to be a useful addition to the toolbox of
both theoretical economists and policy practitioners alike. At least in the context of
a small open economy, there is no justiﬁcation whatsoever to use models based on
a blatantly unrealistic description of demography. Had mortality not caught up with
him, Benjamin Gompertz would probably support that conclusion!
28Under the twin assumptions that (i) consumption and leisure are both normal goods and (ii) that
¯ n(v,v) < 1 (newborns consume some leisure), the upper bound can be ignored as it is always satisﬁed.
29The retirement date is that time period, t





just becomes equal to zero. The
retirement age is then deﬁned as t
R − v. Provided ¯ n(v,t) is decreasing in t − v, all agents older that
t
R − v are retired also.
28Appendix
In this brief appendix we derive some key results used in the paper. More detailed
derivations are presented in Heijdra and Romp (2005).
Proof of Lemma 1
By deﬁnition, M (u) ≡
  u
0 m(s)ds so that M (0) = 0, M′ (u) = m(u) ≥ 0, and
M′′ (u) = m′ (u) ≥ 0. Since M (s) is a convex function of s we have M (s) ≥
M (u) + m(u)[s − u] and thus:














[s − u]e−[λs+M(s)]ds < 0. (A.7)
Similarly, part (ii) is obtained by differentiating ∆(u,λ) with respect to u:
∂∆(u,λ)
∂u
= [λ + m(u)]∆(u,λ) − 1 < 0, (A.8)
where the sign follows from (A.6). Parts (iv)-(v) are obvious. Q.E.D.
Macroeconomic shocks
All the shocks studied (or mentioned) in Section 4 of the paper can be expressed in
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0 for t < 0
−dz0e−χt + dˆ z[1 − e−χt] for t ≥ 0
. (A.12)




r − n + χ
−
(r − n)dz0
r − n + χ
, (A.13)
d(t) =
dˆ g + dz0
χ
[1 − e−χt]. (A.14)
The time at which the shock occurs is normalized to zero.
The three shocks explicitly studied in the text are:
• Unanticipated andpermanent balanced-budget increase ingovernment consump-
tion: g (t) set as in (A.11), z (t) set according to (A.12) and (A.13) with χ → ∞,
i.e. dˆ g = dˆ z. No debt ﬁnancing occurs, i.e. d(t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
• Ricardian equivalence experiment, temporary tax cut: g (t) = 0, z (t) set ac-
cording to (A.12) and (A.13) with 0 < χ ≪ ∞, and the (stable) path of debt is
set according to (A.14).
• Unanticipated and permanent increase in the world interest rate: dr > 0 for
t ≥ 0.
A fourth shock is only mentioned because its effects are very similar to those of
the temporary tax cut:
• Temporary productivity shock: g (t) = z (t) = d(t) = 0, w(t) set according to
(A.9) with 0 < ξ ≪ ∞.
Post-Shock Proﬁles
The steady-state age proﬁles for the different variables before the shock occurs (t < 0)
are deﬁned for individual households in (2.24)-(2.26) and for cohort-level variables
in (3.6) and (3.8)-(3.9). After the shock occurs (t ≥ 0), the paths for individual and
cohort-level human wealth are, respectively,
¯ h(v,t) = ˆ w∆(t − v,rN) + dw0e−ξt∆(t − v,rN + ξ)
− dˆ z∆(t − v,rN) + [dz0 + dˆ z]e−χt∆(t − v,rN + χ), (A.15)
and:
H(v,t) = ˆ wΩ(t − v,rN) + dw0e−ξtΩ(t − v,rN + ξ)
− dˆ zΩ(t − v,rN) + [dz0 + dˆ z]e−χtΩ(t − v,rN + χ). (A.16)
30For households who were born before the shock (v < 0), the age index at the time
of the shock is −v > 0. For such households, the paths for consumption and asset
holdings (at individual and cohort level) after the shock (t ≥ 0) are given by:
¯ cE(v,t) =
ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ¯ h(v,0)
∆(−v,θ)
e(rN−θ)t, (A.17)
¯ aE(v,t) = ∆(t − v,θ)¯ cE(v,t) − ¯ h(v,t), (A.18)
CE(v,t) = eM(−v) ˆ A(−v) + H(v,0)
∆(−v,θ)
e(rN−θ−n)t−M(t−v), (A.19)
AE(v,t) = ∆(t − v)CE(v,t) − H(v,t), (A.20)
where the subscript “E” denotes existing households (at the time of the shock).
For households that are born after the shock (v ≥ 0), the relevant age index at time
t (≥ v) is deﬁned as t − v. For such households the paths for consumption and asset










AF(v,t) = ∆(t − v,θ)CF(v,t) − H(v,t), (A.24)
where the subscript “F” denotes future households.
Welfare Effects
The welfare effects of the different shocks are illustrated in Figure 7 in the text. For
existing agents the change in welfare from the perspective of the shock period t = 0 is
evaluated (dΛ(v,0) for v ≤ 0) whereas for future agents the welfare change from the
perspective of their birth date is computed (dΛ(v,v) for v > 0).
Existing generations
Equation (4.2) is derived as follows. The effect on welfare of existing agents at t = 0




[ln ¯ cE(v,τ) − lnˆ ¯ c(v,τ)]e−θτ−M(τ−v)+M(−v)dτ. (A.25)
31Consumption after the shock can be written in terms of pre-shock consumption:
¯ cE(v,τ) =





ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ˆ ¯ h(−v)
∆(−v,θ)
e(r−θ)τ +
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¯ h(v,0) − ˆ ¯ h(−v)





ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ¯ h(v,0)
ˆ ¯ a(−v) + ˆ ¯ h(−v)
 
ˆ ¯ c(v,τ). (A.26)
By taking logarithms of (A.26) and rewriting we obtain:
ln¯ cE(v,τ) − lnˆ ¯ c(v,τ) = (rN − r)τ + lnΓE(v), (A.27)





























τe−θτ−M(τ−v)+M(−v)dτ + ∆(−v,θ)lnΓE(v). (A.28)
Equation (A.28) coincides with (4.2) in the text.
Future generations





[ln¯ cF(v,τ) − lnˆ ¯ c(v,τ)]e−θ[τ−v]−M(τ−v)dτ. (A.29)












ˆ ¯ c(v,τ). (A.30)
By taking logarithms of (A.30) and rewriting we obtain:
ln¯ cF(v,τ) − lnˆ ¯ c(v,τ) = (rN − r)(τ − v) + lnΓF(v), (A.31)
























se−[θs+M(s)]ds + ∆(0,θ)lnΓF(v). (A.32)
Equation (A.32) coincides with (4.4) in the text.
33Table 1: Estimated Survival Functions
ˆ µ0 ˆ µ1 ˆ µ2 ˆ ¯ u ˆ σ ˆ n(b)   1 − Φ(100)
1. Constant 0.7026×10−2 – – – 0.2277 0.80 49.53
M (u) = µ0u (4.92)
2. Linear −0.8970×10−2 0.0152 – – 0.1199 – –
M (u) = µ0u + µ2
1u2 (−3.83) (12.29)
– 0.0104 – – 0.1595 0.49 34.05
(13.66)
3. Piece-wise linear (PWL) 0.1544×10−2 0.0410 – 60.85 0.0294 0.37 6.57
M (u) = µ0u + δ (u)µ2
1 (u − ¯ u)
2 (6.41) (16.12) (43.08)
δ (u) =
 
0 for 0 < u < ¯ u
1 for u ≥ ¯ u
4. Gompertz-Makeham (GM) 0.5834×10−3 0.3419×10−4 0.0928 – 0.0018 0.37 1.69
M (u) = µ0u + (µ1/µ2)[e 2u − 1] (24.76) (27.01) (193.71)
3
4Surviving fraction (1 − Φ)





























Figure 1: Actual and Estimated Survival Rates
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Figure 2: Steady-State Proﬁles for Individuals
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Figure 3: Steady-State Proﬁles for Cohorts
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Figure 4: Balanced-Budget Fiscal Policy
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Figure 5: Ricardian Equivalence Experiment: Temporary Tax Cut
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Figure 6: Increase in the World Interest Rate
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Figure 7: Welfare Effects
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Figure 8: Aggregate Effect of the Shocks
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